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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

court agreed that the Association had exceeded its authority and
found the Association had committed theft and conversion of Watson's
shares.
The appellate court reviewed de novo the trial court's
interpretation of the statute. Rather than interpreting only the word
"repair," it examined the phrase of the statute which allowed
a
reservoir company "to keep its reservoir in good repair." The court
held that the meaning of the phrase was apparent on its face. The
Association existed solely to supply water for irrigation to its
shareholder's land. To fulfill its sole purpose the statute must allow
the assessment to keep the reservoir in good condition. The court
held the statute authorized the assessment, including the forfeiture of
Watson's shares.
DarrellBrown

GEORGIA
City of Centerville v. City of Warner Robins, 508 S.E.2d 161 (Ga.
1998) (upholding a consent judgment which designated to one
municipality all the service area outside another municipality's
exclusive service area).
In 1995, the Superior Court of Houston County entered a consent
order ("1995 Order") submitted by the City of Centerville
("Centerville") and consented to by the City of Warner Robins
("Warner Robins"). The 1995 Order resolved a dispute between
Centerville and Warner Robins concerning the provision of water and
sewer services. The 1995 Order designated a specific tract of land as
the exclusive water and sewer area of Centerville. All other areas
serviced by either city would continue to be served by the respective
municipality. The 1995 Order prohibited each municipality from
providing water and sewer services to areas within the exclusive service
area of the other municipality. Additionally, the 1995 Order estopped
each municipality from annexing any area within the exclusive service
area of the other municipality. In 1997, Warner Robins filed a
complaint seeking an injunction against Centerville from carrying out
plans to provide water and sewer service outside Centerville's exclusive
service area. A second order was entered in 1998 ("1998 Order") by
the superior court concluding that the original 1995 Order was a
consent agreement and that all the area outside the Centerville
exclusive service area comprised Warner Robin's exclusive service area.
Thus, the 1998 Order enjoined Centerville's plans for providing water
and sewer service. Centerville raised three issues on appeal: (1)
whether the 1995 Order was properly deemed a "consent judgment;"
(2) whether the superior court usurped control over the legislative
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function of annexation; and (3) whether the 1998 Order properly
interpreted the 1995 Order to grant all the area outside the exclusive
service of Centerville to Warner Robins.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held: (1) the 1995 Order was
properly treated as a consent judgment; (2) the superior court did not
usurp control over a legislative function; and (3) the superior court
properly interpreted the 1995 Order to designate to Warner Robins all
the area outside the exclusive service area of Centerville.
First, the court recognized that the original 1995 consent order
resulted from an affirmative act of the parties, rather than the
judgment of the court following litigation of the issues. The court
noted that a consent judgment is a voluntary stipulation by the parties
entered into in order to resolve a dispute. The 1995 Order was the
culmination of settlement efforts of Centerville and Warner Robins in
determining service areas.
Thus, the superior court properly
characterized the 1995 Order as a consentjudgment.
In deciding the second issue, the court recognized that the power
of annexation is a legislative function, not subject to control by the
judiciary. However, the superior court did not attempt to usurp
control over this function, it merely enforced the 1995 Order. In the
1995 Order, Centerville agreed not to seek annexation of property
within the Warner Robins service area. Thus, the superior court
merely sought to enforce that agreement.
Finally, the court noted that the 1995 Order failed to clearly
describe the Warner Robins service area in the same detail as it
described the Centerville service area. However, the superior court
properly used the general rules of contract construction in referring to
the record in order to construe the ambiguity. The record clearly
indicated the intent of the parties to designate to Warner Robins all
the area outside of Centerville's exclusive service area. Thus, the
superior court properly interpreted the 1995 Order.
CandaceDeen

KANSAS
Water District No. 1 v. Mission Hills Country Club, 960 P.2d 239 (Kan.
1998) (holding water district had an exclusive right under the Water
District Act to provide pressurized treated water by pipeline within the
district's boundaries and that this exclusive right did not violate the
Commerce Clause).
A privately owned Kansas Water Company ("KWC") obtained its
water supply from Kansas City, Missouri. In 1990, Water District No. 1
("District"), pursuant to the Kansas Water District Act ("Act"),
voluntarily annexed the area served by KWC. Therefore, Mission Hills

